This paper examines empirically the impacts of sharing rules of origin (RoOs) with other ASEAN+1 free trade agreements (FTAs) on ASEAN-Korea FTA/ASEAN-China FTA utilization in Thai exports in 2011. Our careful empirical analysis suggests that the harmonization of RoOs across FTAs play some role in reducing the costs yielded through the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In particular, the harmonization to "change-in-tariff classification (CTC) or real value-added content (RVC)" will play a relatively positive role in not seriously discouraging firms' use of multiple FTA schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC or CTC&RVC hinders firms from using those schemes. FTAs play some role in reducing the costs yielded through the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In particular, the harmonization to "change-in-tariff classification (CTC) or real value-added content (RVC)" will play a relatively positive role in not seriously discouraging firms' use of multiple FTA schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC or CTC&RVC hinders firms from using those schemes.
Introduction
Against the background of the explosive increase of free trade agreements (FTAs), there is a rising concern regarding the so-called "spaghetti bowl phenomenon".
Although several definitions of this phenomenon have been proposed, its essence is the rise of costs for the use of FTA schemes under a larger number of FTA schemes.
1 Such § We are grateful to Fukunari Kimura, Kohei Shiino, and Seiya Sukegawa for their helpful comments. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of any of the institutions with which we are affiliated. # Corresponding author: Kazunobu Hayakawa; Address: Bangkok Research Center, Japan External Trade Organization, 16th Floor, Nantawan Building, 161 Rajadamri Road, Pathumwan, Bangkok 10330, Thailand; Tel: 66-2-253-6441; Fax: 66-2-254-1447 ; E-mail: kazunobu_hayakawa@ide-jetro.org.a concern emerges also in East Asia. In particular, ASEAN countries have multilateral FTAs with six countries including Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. These ASEAN+1 FTAs are the Australia-New Zealand-ASEAN FTA (AANZFTA), ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) , ASEAN-India FTA (AIFTA) , ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) , and ASEAN-Korea FTA (AKFTA) . AANZFTA, ACFTA, AIFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA entered into force in 2010, 2004, 2010, 2008, and 2007, respectively. There are also many bilateral FTAs by ASEAN countries. This situation is called a "noodle bowl" in Baldwin (2008) , i.e., a situation more complicated than a "spaghetti bowl".
The crucial sources for the rise in costs for FTA use through such a phenomenon are various kinds of differences across FTAs. Those include differences in FTA preferential products, FTA preferential rates, rules of origin (RoOs), and necessary documents for certificates of origin (CoOs). For example, the share of eligible products out of all products is widely different across ASEAN+1 FTAs. Even if a product is eligible for all those FTAs, the preferential rates might still be different because the years of entry into force are different and most of the preferential products reduce the tariff rates gradually, i.e., staging elimination. The general RoOs are "Change in Heading (CH) or Real Value-added Content (RVC)" in AANZFTA, AJCEP, and AKFTA, "RVC" in ACFTA, and "Change in Subheading and RVC" in AIFTA. In using multiple ASEAN+1 FTAs, firms must check these differences, which may result in substantial costs for firms. This paper focuses on the differences in RoOs across FTAs. Specifically, our question in this paper is whether or not it is possible to avoid a rise in compliance costs if RoOs are harmonized across FTAs. 2 We examine FTA utilization in exporting from
Thailand to Korea or China in 2011. That is, sample FTA schemes are restricted to ACFTA and AKFTA. Then, we examine whether or not the FTA utilization is higher when ACFTA/AKFTA shares RoOs with some other ASEAN+1 FTAs including AANZFTA, AIFTA, and AJCEP. If such commonality of RoOs raises FTA utilization, the harmonization of RoOs across FTA schemes will contribute to reducing the costs for simultaneously complying with RoOs in multiple FTA schemes.
The potential impacts of RoOs harmonization on FTA utilization are mixed and might be different among RoOs. Suppose that a firm in Thailand exports its product to China and Korea and that RoOs for this product are "Change in Tariff Classification (CTC)" in both ACFTA and AKFTA (here we do not consider more detailed CTC rules such as CH). This firm uses significant inputs from the U.S. Under this example, if the firm can comply with CTC in ACFTA, it must be also able to do so in AKFTA because compliance with CTC in ACFTA means a substantial transformation of U.S. inputs, which also can meet CTC in AKFTA. In other words, compliance with CTC in two FTA schemes is possible. However, if compliance in ACFTA becomes possible by using significant inputs from China, it may be difficult to comply with CTC in AKFTA because inputs from China are non-originating inputs for AKFTA. A similar story applies to the case of RVC. Compliance with RVC in ACFTA implies that a significant portion of inputs comes from member countries including China and Thailand. In the case of using a significant portion of inputs from members other than China (i.e., inputs from ASEAN countries), compliance with RVC in AKFTA is possible because inputs from ASEAN countries are also originating inputs for AKFTA. However, in the case of using a significant portion of inputs from China, it is difficult to comply with RVC in AKFTA because inputs from China are non-originating inputs for AKFTA. "CTC or RVC" is one of the candidates of RoOs that enables relatively easy simultaneous compliance in multiple FTA schemes. Suppose that both ACFTA and AKFTA adopt "CTC or RVC" for the product in the above example. If a significant portion of inputs come from China, the firm will be able to comply particularly with "RVC" in ACFTA. Even in this case, if such inputs from China are substantially transformed, the firm can comply with "CTC" in AKFTA. Namely, the harmonization of RoOs to "CTC or RVC" may enable firms to comply easily with RoOs in those FTAs, at least compared with "CTC" and "RVC". However, it is obvious that, even in this case, if the inputs from China are not substantially transformed, the firm cannot comply with "CTC or RVC" in AKFTA. In sum, the impacts of RoOs harmonization will differ by firm (i.e., firm's procurement patterns) and RoOs (e.g., CTC or RVC). In this paper, we evaluate the average impacts according to RoOs.
This paper is related to some existing studies. First, it is close to Hayakawa (2013) in terms of empirically studying the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. In using multiple FTA schemes, firms will need to use more local inputs because local inputs can meet RoOs in any FTA. Based on this hypothesis, Hayakawa (2013) found for Japanese affiliates in ASEAN that users of more than two FTA schemes have around 6% higher local input share. Furthermore, users of more than six FTA schemes have around 20%-30% higher local input share. As a result, he concludes that some amount of benefits from such FTA use is offset by the change in procurement sources because the original pattern of procurement should be optimal. In sum, Hayakawa (2013) shows the existence of "costs" for the spaghetti bowl phenomenon. On the other hand, our paper shows how we could avoid or minimize such costs.
Second, this paper also belongs to the literature analyzing the determinants on FTA utilization. Bureau et al. (2007) The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section presents basic information on ASEAN+1 FTAs. After specifying our empirical framework to examine the impacts of common RoOs on FTA utilization in Section 3, we report our estimation results in Section 4. Last, Section 5 concludes this paper.
Basic Information on ASEAN+1 FTAs
This section takes a brief overview of ASEAN+1 FTAs. Table 1 indicates that all products in an HS six-digit code have zero most favoured nation (MFN) rates. "NO" indicates that all products in an HS six-digit code are ineligible for FTA schemes, i.e., are not preferential products. Some RoOs are combinations of simple RoOs including CTC/RVC, CTC&RVC, and so on.
=== Table 1 === In Table 1 , there are five noteworthy points. First, firms in Thailand can enjoy zero MFN rates in exporting half of all products to Australia and Japan. Second, India and Korea designate a relatively large number of products as ineligible products. This is because the tariff reduction for most of the products starts from 2014 in the case of AIFTA and the tariff reduction for the products placed on sensitive-and highly-sensitive lists starts from 2012 in the case of AKFTA. Third, in the case of AJCEP, a relatively large number can be found not only in its general rule, CH/RVC, but also in CC-related
RoOs including CC and CC&TECH. Fourth, purely CTC&RVC rules, which are known to be very restrictive, are found only in AIFTA (CS&RVC) and AKFTA (CH&RVC).
Last, AANZFTA and AJCEP set a relatively wide variety of RoOs depending on products. While such RoOs might be business-friendly if they are set according to the specificity of products, such a variety leads to yielding costs for firms because firms need to check RoOs for their products.
Next, we take a closer look at differences in RoOs across ASEAN+1 FTAs. In particular, we shed light on those of RoOs in ACFTA/AKFTA in comparison with RoOs in the others. Table 2 shows RoOs' matrix showing ACFTA and other ASEAN+1 FTAs. === Table 2 === Such a share is 56% in the case of AJCEP, but the share of eligible products with a margin of (5%, 10%] is also relatively high, at 38%. In the case of ACFTA, relatively high shares can be seen in the eligible products with margins of (5%, 10%] and (10%, 50%]. AKFTA has the highest share of products with a margin of (5%, 10%]. In sum,
we may say that ACFTA and AKFTA have relatively large tariff margins.
=== Table 4 === Table 5 shows FTA utilization rates in Thai exports to Australia, China, India, Japan, and Korea under ASEAN+1 FTA schemes. "Total", "In Eligible", and "Under FTA" mean total exports, exports of eligible products under all tariff schemes, and exports of eligible products under FTA schemes, respectively. Columns (IV) and (V) report "Total" divided by "In Eligible" and "Under FTA", respectively. The rates in 3 http://wits.worldbank.org/WITS/ 4 Thus, in our measure of utilization rates, the numerator and denominator are FOB basis and CIF basis, respectively. This inconsistency may yield some biases in the measurement. It is easily possible to compute the denominator also by employing FOB basis data, i.e., Thai data on exports. Then, since the tariff-line classification in each partner country is different from that in Thailand, we === Table 5 === There are some noteworthy points in Table 5 . Thailand has both bilateral and multilateral FTAs with Australia, India, and Japan, so that FTA utilization rates are rather low in the cases of AANZFTA (1%), AIFTA (23%), and AJCEP (1%). In other words, firms in Thailand tend to use bilateral FTA schemes in exporting to these countries maybe due to those earlier years of entry into force and thus the larger tariff margin. The relatively high rates in AIFTA among these three FTAs are because only the early-harvest program has entered into force in the Thailand-India FTA. ASEAN-China and ASEAN-Korea FTAs have relatively high utilization rates, which are respectively 54% and 48%. However, exports under the ACFTA and AKFTA schemes occupy only 21% and 17% of total exports to China and Korea, respectively.
Empirical Framework
This section specifies our empirical framework for examining the impacts of common RoOs on FTA utilization. In the empirical analysis, we focus on Thai exports to China and Korea. Thailand is a member of not only ACFTA and AKFTA but also AANZFTA, AIFTA, and AJCEP. However, it has both bilateral and multilateral FTA schemes with Australia, India, Japan, and New Zealand. In this case, firms' decisions on FTA use will be qualitatively different; firms will choose their tariff scheme from among MFN rates, bilateral FTA rates, and multilateral FTA rates rather than simply from between MFN rates and FTA rates. Since our aim is not to examine such complicated decisions on tariff schemes, we simply focus on trading pairs in which only a single FTA scheme is available, i.e., China and Korea.
Our analysis is conducted for Thai exports in 2011 at the HS six-digit level. The usual specifications in the previous studies, which are listed in the introductory section, are as follow.
Utilization ic = α Margin ic +γ ln Monthly Exports ic + D ic β + u c + ε ic , are forced to use Thai data on exports at the HS six-digit level. However, since preferential eligibility is defined at the tariff-line level in partner countries, the use of HS six-digit level data in Thailand implies the inclusion of trade values for not only eligible products but also ineligible products, leading to biases in the denominator. In short, the use of Thai data and partners' data results in containing CIF/FOB differences and trade values for ineligible products, respectively. Our decision on the use of partners' data in computing the denominator of FTA utilization rates was made because we believe that the biases from the inclusion of trade values for ineligible products are much more serious than those from CIF/FOB differences.
where Utilization ic is FTA utilization rates in exporting product i to country c. Margin ic denotes preference margin in exporting product i to country c. We aggregate tariffs at the tariff-line level up to those at the HS six-digit level by taking the simple average. In order to examine the impacts of common RoOs, we extend the above equation.
Monthly Exports
Specifically, we introduce a vector of dummy variables, Common (X) ic , as shown in the following.
Utilization ic = α Margin ic +γ ln Monthly Exports ic + Common (X) ic δ+ D ic β + u c + ε ic , where X = {CTC, CTC&RVC, CTC/RVC, RVC, WO}. Let x be an element of X and show a type of RoOs. Then, Common (x) ic takes the value one if RoOs in exporting product i to country c are x and any other ASEAN+1 FTAs also adopt x for that product.
δ is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. For example, the positively significant coefficient for Common (x) implies that the harmonization of RoOs to a type x raises FTA utilization rates. We estimate this model by employing a fractional logit estimation technique proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) because our dependent variable lies in the unit interval, i.e., [0, 1] . 6 The data sources are the same as in the previous section.
5 As theoretically demonstrated in Demidova and Krishna (2008) , even if the tariff margin is trivial, the more productive firms are more likely to use FTA schemes in exporting because such firms have larger outputs and thus obtain larger tariff savings through the use of FTA schemes. 6 The fractional logit model ensures that, unlike the ordinary least square method (OLS), the predicted values of the dependent variable are in the unit interval. Also, unlike the log-odds ratio model and the beta regression model, it can naturally define dependent variables for the boundary values 0 and 1. It imposes less restrictive assumptions than the Tobit model (requiring the normality and homoskedasticity of the dependent variables). For more details, see Ramalho et al. (2011) .
Before reporting our estimation results, several empirical issues are to be noted. 
Empirical Results
This section reports our estimation results. The baseline results are provided in column (I) in Table 6 . To save space, we do not report the estimation results in RoOs dummy variables (available upon request). First, unlike the previous studies, the coefficient for the tariff margin is insignificantly estimated. Second, Monthly Exports is significantly positive, as is consistent with our expectation. Namely, the higher FTA utilization rates are observed in the exports with the larger monthly trade values. Third, the results in RoOs commonality dummy variables are as follow. We can see negatively significant impacts of sharing "CTC", "CTC&RVC", or "WO". The commonality in "CTC/RVC" and "RVC" has insignificant impacts. These results imply that the harmonization to CTC/RVC plays to some extent a good role in terms of not discouraging firms' use of FTA schemes. On the other hand, the harmonization to CTC, CTC&RVC, or WO hinders firms from using those schemes.
=== Table 6 === Next, we conduct several robustness checks on our above baseline results. First, we explore the reasons for the insignificant coefficient for Margin. To do that, we change the method of aggregation. Columns (II) and (III) take minimum rates and maximum rates among tariff rates at the tariff-line level within the same HS six-digit code, respectively. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged. In particular, the coefficients for Margin are still insignificant. Column (IV) introduces a dummy taking the value one for tariff margins above 17% and zero otherwise. "17%" is obtained from the estimation of the Threshold Regression model (see Francois et al., 2006) . While the results in other variables are unchanged, the new dummy has a significantly positive coefficient. The latter result implies that the costs for the use of FTA schemes in exporting from Thailand are 17% on a tariff-equivalent basis. This estimate is rather high compared with the estimates in the previous studies. For example, Francois et al. (2006) found in Cotonou preferences that such costs range between 4% and 4.5%.
Second, we include dummy variables of strict RoOs (e.g., CC, CH, or CS) rather than those of rough RoOs (i.e., CTC). However, for simplicity and avoiding many combinations of RoOs commonality, we restrict the use of RoOs commonality dummy variables to those constructed based on rough RoOs. Also, we use the variable of tariff margin based on the simple average. The results are reported in column (V) and are totally unchanged. In particular, sharing "CTC", "CTC&RVC", or "WO" has negative impacts on FTA utilization but sharing "CTC/RVC" or "RVC" does not.
Third, we take care of the availability of zero MFN rates in other ASEAN+1
FTAs. If firms can use zero MFN rates in exporting to members of other ASEAN+1 FTAs, they are relatively free to adjust their inputs in trying to export to a concerned country under FTA schemes. In order to control for this case, we introduce the variable Table 7 . In the first stage regression, the coefficients for Exports to the ROW are estimated to be significantly positive. The results in the second stage regression are basically unchanged. The noteworthy differences are that the coefficient for Margin is significant in the case of maximum rates and that the coefficients for Common (WO) are insignificant.
=== Table 7 === Last, we account for the possible sample selection biases. The source for such biases is that Utilization is definable only in the case of positive exports. Using the average of monthly exports of product i to the rest of the world, i.e., Exports to the ROW, as an excluded variable, we estimate the Heckman sample selection model, of which estimation results are reported in Table 8 . In the selection equation, the coefficients for Exports to the ROW are estimated to be significantly positive. The coefficients for the inverse of Mills ratio are also estimated to be significant, indicating the necessity of controlling for the sample selection mechanism. The results in the outcome equation are basically unchanged and are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7 , except for Margin(Max). 
